In India, the mother-in-law is all powerful. At least they are often portrayed as such in Indian popular culture. Similarly, in the socio-economic literature, the influence of the Indian motherin-law is often taken for granted. However, most of the empirical evidence relies on qualitative data or on small samples. Looking at stated son preference and using a nationally representative dataset (NFHS-3), we show that, indeed, mothers-in-law have an influence on their daughter-inlaw, everything else constant. This influence comes mostly from socialization rather than from coercion and selection within the marriage market.
Introduction
For centuries, some Indian communities have been known for preferring sons over daughters, with practices such as sex-selective neglects and outright infanticide taking place. With the advent of sex-selective abortion technologies in the 1980s, technologies aimed to improve maternal and fetuses' health, such as aminoncentis, are now routinely used to selectively eliminate female fetuses in those communities.
While in the past, the elimination of female infants was limited to some particular groups, in recent years this practice has spread across India and even among Indian communities living overseas (Abrevaya 2009 ). Hence, an estimated half million female fetuses a year are estimated to be sex-selectively aborted in India alone (Jha et al. 2006) . 1 Putting aside moral consideration, this strong preference for sons, and its implementation, will bring important challenges for future generations as an estimated 28-32 million men would be in excess in the marriage market by 2020 (Hudson and Den Boer 2002) . Unable to find a match, those 'left-over' from the marriage market may vent out their frustration in violent and socially disturbing ways (Hudson and Den Boer 2002) .
Given the extent of the problem, an extensive literature on son preference has emerged. While traditionally the focus of the literature has been on revealed son preference, such as sex-selective neglect, gender bias in child mortality or stopping behavior in fertility history, recently a new stream of literature is picking up, focusing on stated son preference (Gaudin 2011 , Pande and Astone 2007 , Robitaille 2012 . This paper belongs to this latter group.
While stated son preference and sex-selective elimination of girls are correlated, the correlation is not constant over time. Indeed, despite a drop in stated son preference over time, with younger generations having lower stated son preference than their elder, the sex ratio among children remains highly skewed in favor of boys ( Figure 1 ). 2 In this paper, we argue that this phenomenon can be explained not only by the drop in the "cost" of implementing son preference, thanks to sex-selective abortion, but also by the influence of mothers-in-law in determining which child will live and which child will be eliminated.
[ Figure 1 , about here] Indeed, while it is true that in many societies the mother-in-law has bad press, their vilification seems particularly strong in India. As in other countries they are, for example, often accused, rightly or wrongly, of interfering in their children's marital life thus making life difficult, if not impossible, for their son or daughter-in-law. But the extent of their perceived influence seems impressive for Western eyes.
It is, for example, common for mothers-in-law to participate in the selection of the bride (Sheela and Audinarayana 2003) . They are often believed to influence the number of children a daughter-in-law has (Char et al. 2010) as well as her use of sex-selective abortion (Visaria 2007) .
Newspapers often report the involvement of the mother-in-law in kitchen fires, that is, the elimination of an unwanted daughter-in-law in an "accidental" kitchen fire (Sinha 2011) . One common reason for women to commit suicide in India is torture by their in-laws (Batra 2003;  Times of India 2011). Unsurprisingly, daughters-in-law are believed to prefer living in a nuclear household, away from their "controlling" mothers-in-law (Chorghade et al. 2006) .
Given the importance of male descendants in Indian culture, the influence of the all-powerful mother-in-law should be felt in this area as well. This could occur through the marriage marketwith the mother-in-law selecting the bride-to-be based, notably, on her son preference. It could also occur through the socialization of the young bride in her marital family-as it is not uncommon in India that women are married during adolescence, if not during childhood, and
hence an important part of the socialization is done in the marital family rather than in the natal family. And, finally, it could also occur through carrot and stick incentives put in place to bring the daughter-in-law to fit into her new marital family-through, for example, domestic violence, limited mobility and limited involvement in decision making.
After developing a theoretical model explain how mothers-in-law can influence their daughterin-law's son preference, we use data from the third nationally representative National and Family
Health Survey (NFHS-3) collected in [2005] [2006] , to empirically test our hypothesis. Our results
show that, indeed, the mother-in-law in India is often able to influence her daughter-in-law's stated son preference. However, given data limitation, we cannot provide definitive answers on the mechanisms used by the mother-in-law to influence her daughter-in-law. We nevertheless present evidence that socialization seems to be the main driver behind a mother-in-law's influence on her daughter-in-law rather than pre-selection in the marriage market and coercion.
Those pieces of evidence need however to be taken with caution as more data is needed to confirm or invalidate these results. There are however interesting results to launch a debate on the importance of a mother-in-law on their daughter-in-law's son preference.
This paper contributes to the literature in two main ways. First, it contributes to the literature on stated son preference by being the first attempt to show the importance of the mother-in-law on their daughter-in-law's stated son preference. It also contributes to the literature on family relations as it is, as far as we know, the first paper to use a nationally representative sample to quantify the influence of mothers-in-law on their daughters-in-law.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, background information is given on son preference in India and its implication for the sex ratio among children. In section three, the mother-in-law/daughter-in-law relationship in Indian households is discussed, with evidence from demographic, sociologic and anthropologic literatures. In section four, a theoretical model is developed linking mother-in-law's preference to their daughter-inlaw's preference. Section five briefly discusses the data and the estimation strategy before turning to descriptive statistics and multivariate results in sections six and seven, respectively.
Section eight teases out different mechanisms that can be used by the mothers-in-law to influence/coerce their daughters-in-law. Finally, policy implications and concluding remarks are presented in section nine.
Son Preference in India
As early as 1853, the British recorded abnormal sex ratios among some communities in India (J.P. Grant, Officiating Secretary the Government of India, 7 September 1853, cited in Oldenburg, 2002:41) . In his report, Grant states that the motivation behind sex-selective neglect and infanticide, leading to these abnormal sex ratios, are for religious, caste and financial 6 reasons. Almost two centuries later, the root causes of son preference remain the same. What has changed, however, is that imbalance in sex ratios has now spread across communities and that sex selective elimination of females has never been so easy. After reviewing the different cultural and economic factors behind son preference in India, this section will discuss how this geographically limited problem has spread to most of India in recent years. It should however be kept in mind that India is an extremely diverse country and, henceforth, the motivations for preferring boys over girls are not necessarily the same across all communities. What follows is hence only a mere generalization and should be taken as such.
Among the key cultural motivation for preferring sons over daughters is the crucial role played by the son in Hinduism. In particular, a son plays a key role at his parents' funerals and at securing them a good afterlife. A son also continues the family name (Das Gupta et al. 2003) and inherits the land (Kishor and Parasuramam 1998) .
Financial motivations, rooted in cultural practices, also play a crucial role. Indeed, once of adult age, a son will marry and will bring a daughter-in-law-and a dowry-to his natal family, he will remain with his parents and the fruit of his labor will be shared with his parents and siblings.
In contrast, a daughter would be married off-a dowry would have to be paid-she would live with her marital family and would be banned from supporting her natal family by both cultural taboo and her in-laws (Das Gupta 1987; Das Gupta et al. 2003) . Her parents are however expected to offer her gifts and pay for her upbringing. An Indian saying summarizes well this situation: "Raising a daughter is like watering your neighbour's garden" (Guilmoto, 2007) .
As bearing a son is considered a daughter-in-law's duty and responsibility, a woman who cannot
give birth or who gives birth only to daughters may have to live with the wrath of her in-laws until the birth of their first male child (Das Gupta et al. 2003 ).
This may result in such thing as the daughter-in-law being given less autonomy, having a higher share of household chores to perform or being given less time to recover from child delivery. As a result, having a son is generally seen as empowering women in their marital family, leading women to dearly desire sons (Das Gupta et al. 2003) .
In more extreme case, not giving birth to a son may result in domestic violence, psychological abuse or abandonment. The birth of a son would not only eliminate one reason behind physical and emotional abuse but can also provide protection against future violence, once the son is of age to protect his mother (Rao 1997) . Hence, using data from a community in South India, Rao (1997) demonstrates that the risk of physical violence decreases with the birth of a son.
However, the total number of sons a woman will have over her fertility history is not known for young women (with living and co-residing mothers-in-law) as these women have not necessarily completed their fertility history. A proxy is nevertheless available as we have data on the number of sons and the number of daughters those young brides desire. Finally, for all respondents, the following question was asked: 'How many of these children would you like to be boys, how many would you like to be girls and for how many would it not matter?'
Mother-in-Law in India
Given the importance of male descendants in India and given the perceived important role of mother-in-law in decision making, it would be surprising that mothers-in-law do not influence, or at least try to influence, their son's and daughter-in-law's desire for sons.
While only a limited number of studies have been conducted on the role of mothers-in-law in decision making on matters concerning directly their son, there is some evidence that they do indeed play an important role. This evidence, however, comes mostly from qualitative studies and/or studies that rely on a geographically limited dataset.
Starting with qualitative evidence, in a study in Maharashtra, Ganatra et al (2001) conclude that in-laws' pressure to mother a son were often invoked as a reason for seeking sex-selective abortion. For example, a 21 years old respondent stated that "My mother-in-law used to say: 'I won't say anything, but tomorrow if my son starts feeling that he should have a son and if he thinks about remarrying, then don't blame me at that time. You manage with that'. After all such things, I am having fear in my mind, so I thought let's try and go for checking (the sex)." (Ganatra et al 2001: 115) .
Similarly, Puri et al (2011) show that Indian immigrant women in the United States who have performed sex-selective abortion were often facing pressure, not only from their husband, but also from females in-law to abort their female fetus.
Moving next to quantitative studies, Char et al (2010) , looking at the influence of mother-in-law on modern contraception use in India, using a sample of 60 daughter-in-law/mother-in-law dyads, and conclude that the mother-in-law does not have an impact on temporary contraception use but they have a say on when the daughter-in-law should get sterilized and that this decision depends on the number of sons she already has.
While among scholars, there seem to be a consensus that mothers-in-law are often powerful in India, the same cannot be said about respondents' opinions. Indeed, in a study in Karachi (Pakistan) 3 , Kadir's et al. (2003) show that for a range of decision making events, mothers-inlaw, and even more so, sons, believe that the mother-in-law has a say. This belief however is not shared by the daughters-in-law! Hence, while the literature seems to point towards a key role played by the mothers-in-law in decision making, respondents' perception is much less clear cut. In any case, a mother-in-law can use three main strategies to influence the sex ratio among their grand-children.
The first strategy is simply to select a daughter-in-law sharing a similar degree of preference for sons as her mother-in-law. This is feasible in the Indian context given the involvement of parents, particularly the mothers, in selecting the bribe/groom of their offspring. Indeed, Mathur (2007) states that most marriages in India involve parents, with varying involvement of the bride and groom-to-be. If this is the case, the "influence" of the mothers-in-law should be felt immediately after marriage.
The second strategy would be to socialize the daughter-in-law so that her son preference mimics her mother-in-law's son preference. This strategy would take some times and, henceforth, the mothers-in-law's influence would be felt only some years after the marriage. We would also expect socialization to be particularly important for daughters-in-law who have been married early and henceforth were in contact with their mother-in-law during their formative years.
Finally, a mother-in-law can use a "stick and carrot" strategy to align her daughter-in-law's son preference to hers. This "stick and carrot" strategy can be overtly stated, with for example the mother-in-law professing physical threat, or can be implicit, with the society promising rewards to mothers of sons but hardship to mothers of daughters. Supporting this latter mechanism, Rao (1997) concludes that women with more sons and women who have not been sterilized are less likely to be abused. Similarly, Fernandez's (1997) study on domestic violence in Bombay argues that, in some cases, violence is caused by the women not giving birth to a son. This perceived 'wrong-doing' of the daughter-in-law results in violence taking a whole range, from verbal abuse to murder.
Theoretical Model
In this paper we argue that mothers-in-law are able to influence their daughters-in-law' demand for sons. Theoretical models explaining the demand for children have become fairly standard in the economic literature since Becker's (1991) seminal work.
More specifically, the demand for children depends on price of children, real income of the household, various government programs (baby bonus, aid to mothers, tax exemption) and social position such as the rural-urban divide, rich versus poor, and developed versus developing countries. Becker (1991) constructed a demand for children model by maximizing the utility function U(n, Z) of the parents subject to the budget constraint of I = p n .n + p z .Z where n is the number of children, Z is a composite aggregate of other consumption commodities, p n is the cost (including time cost) of producing and rearing children, p z is the price of commodities and I is the full income of the household. He observed that the demand for children (that is the optimal quantity of children) is determined by the relative price of children (in an inverse way) and the household income. The cost of children depends on the number of children as well as a number of other factors such as the contribution of children to household income. Becker (1991) went on to include the quality of children and expenditure for such; however, he did not distinguish between two types of children -the male and female. In our model, we distinguish between sons and daughters in the utility function of the daughter-in-law and include the preference of the mother-in-law towards having a grandson.
We assume that the daughter-in-law has a separable utility function
where s is the number of sons and d is the number of daughters; U(s) and V(d) are the utilities the daughter-in-law has from having sons and daughters respectively. We assume that the mother-inlaw's utility is also separable on her number of grandsons, s, and granddaughters, d, with ( ) ( ) ( ). However, we make the simplistic assumption that ( ) and the utility of the mother-in-law is approximated by ( ). Thus the mother-in-law derives utility from only the number of sons her daughter-in-law has 4 . is the 'power' of the mother-in-law over the daughter-in-law's preference. The utility from consumption of the composite consumption good x for the daughter-in-law is given by C(x). This is a full life-cycle span of consumption for the daughter-in-law and hence savings is not included in our model. We assume
There is diminishing marginal utility from having more children for the daughter-in-law as well as for the mother-in-law. The power of the mother-in-law is given exogenously in this modelit is determined by social norms (such as the involvement of the mothers-in-law in marriage decisions or the respect given to elderly women), the relative position of the mother-in-law in the household and her mental and/or physical control over the daughter-in-law. If , then the utility of the daughter-in-law is given as ( ) ( ) ( ). The daughter-in-law herself has a higher weightage for having a son than a daughter and this is captured by the fact the utility from having one more son is higher than the utility from having one more daughter or ( ) ( ) . The mother-in-law has a stronger preference than the daughter-in-law for the daughter-in-law to have a son, that is, ( ) ( ) . Also, ( ) ( ) ( ) . The preference patterns of the daughter-in-law and the mother-in-law over the daughter-in-law having children is shown in Figure 2 .
[ Figure 2 , about here]
The preference of the mother-in-law puts a higher weightage on the daughter-in-law's preference for having a son and a lower weightage for daughter preference. We also assume that the cost of having children includes time cost of raising them and there is no bequest in this model. The daughter-in-law maximizes her utility subject to a budget constraint
where is the price of x, is the cost (time cost and money cost) of raising children, and I is the household income from other sources (income of other household members, assets). We assume, given no savings, equality to hold in the budget constraint and construct the Lagrangian utility function of the daughter-in-law as
The daughter-in-law maximizes her utility from x, s and d. Detailed derivations are presented in the Appendix. The first order conditions yield:
If , then we can say that optimum value for x, s and d are such that the money value of consumption is the same as the money value of having a son or a daughter at the margin for the daughter-in-law. Then
where the subscript 0 denotes the optimum value at . That is to say, ( ) ( ). Since ( ) ( ) this implies that which means that even if the mother-in-law had no influence on the daughter-in-law's preference, the latter would want more sons than daughters. However, if the mother-in-law has , then ( )
( ) where d* and s* denote 14 the optimum number of daughters and son that the daughter-in-law will want to have. This implies that suggesting that the mother-in-law uses her power to decrease the number of daughters and increase the number of sons that the daughter-in-law would want to have in the optimum. This leads us to the following propositions:
Proposition 1: The power of the mother-in-law has a positive influence on the relative son preference of the daughter-in-law.
Proposition 2: As the power of the mother-in-law over the daughter-in-law increases, the daughter-in-law wants to have increasingly more sons and fewer daughters.
Let us look at the comparative static with . From the first order optimality condition
increases the left hand side of the equality gets smaller and the right hand side gets larger keeping d* and s* unchanged. This means that equality will now hold at number of daughters and number of sons such that and .
In summary, Propositions 1 and 2 imply that the power of the mother-in-law distorts the preference of the daughter-in-law towards wanting to have sons. The more powerful the motherin-law, the greater is the distortion of the daughter-in-law's preference away from having daughters and towards having sons. The power of the mother-in-law has been assumed to be exogenous in this model and a high can be attained through a physical, social, or psychological dominance of the mother-in-law over the daughter-in-law. We now move on to empirically test the above propositions.
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Data and Estimation Strategy
To empirically test our model, we use the third National Indian states has been divided into rural, urban and sometimes slum/non-slum areas, having a probability of one to be sampled. Each rural stratum has then been subdivided into primary sampling units (PSU), with a probability of being sampled proportional to size. In urban areas, within each PSU sampled, a census enumeration block was selected with a probability proportional to size. Households have then been randomly selected from those PSU/census enumeration blocks, and a household questionnaire was administered. A woman questionnaire was also administered to all women aged 15 to 49 years old.
In order to study the impact of a mothers-in-law's son preference on their daughters-in-law's son preference, we need to observe both the daughter-in-law and the mother-in-law. In NFHS-3, this situation occurs whenever the mother-in-law and her daughter-in-law co-reside.
More precisely, NFHS-3 data contains information about all women aged 15-49 years old in the surveyed household. Given the young average age of marriage in India (18 years old for women and 23 years old for men in 2006), we are able to match the daughter-in-law with her mother-inlaw in 3,534 cases. 5 One caveat is that the information is only available for relatively young daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law, as mothers-in-law cannot be aged more than 49 years old if they are to be part of the sample. Young women are, however, the most important group as they are the one starting their fertility history and, hence, are the ones whose decision on the number of extra sons they will bear matters in determining the overall population sex-ratio among young children. Another limitation is that we are only looking at the preference of daughters-in-law living in extended households, a phenomenon widespread in India, with 46% of the women surveyed by NFHS-3 living in such households. 6 It is, however, possible that women living in nuclear households have different unobservable characteristics such as being more empowered and, therefore, less permeable to their mothers-in-law' influence than women living in extended households (Bloom et al. 2001) . To account for this sample selection, a Heckman model is estimated as a robustness check. The main conclusions remain. Finally, we do not have data on mother-in-law's stated son preference for her daughter-in-law but rather need to rely on mother-in-law's stated son preference for her-self. Despite these two variables not necessarily taking the same value, they are likely to be highly correlated. This is however a non-tested assumption.
Using NFHS-3 data, we want to estimate the impact of mothers-in-law's stated son preference on their daughter-in-law's stated son preference, holding constant the other determinants of son preference identified in the literature, that is, we want to estimate:
where pref d is the daughter-in-law's stated son preference, as previously defined, pref m is her mother-in-law's stated son preference and ε is the error term. β is again the 'power' of the mothers-in-law on their daughters-in-law. 
Descriptive Statistics
From a public perspective, the influence of mothers-in-law on the child sex ratio matters only if mothers-in-law have, on average, higher son preference than their daughters-in-law. As shown in Table 1 , this is indeed the case. While co-residing daughters-in-law have no preference for sons at a proportion of 79%, this is true for only 65% of co-residing mothers-in-law, a statistically significant difference. 8, 9 This difference in son preference between daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law is likely to be due, in part, to differences in characteristics. In Robitaille (2012) , it was shown that younger women, more educated women and women more exposed to media have, everything else constant, a lower stated son preference. Daughters-in-law are more likely to have those characteristics than their mothers-in-law (Table 1) .
[ Table 1 about here]
Mothers-in-law not only have stronger son preference than daughters-in-law, the two of them are also highly correlated. As shown in Table 2 , the higher the mothers-in-law's son preference is, the higher the proportion of daughters-in-law with a strong son preference. More precisely, while 82% of daughters-in-law with a mother-in-law having no son preference have no son preference themselves, this proportion drops to 75% among daughters-in-law with a mother-in-law preferring one extra son, and dropping further to 69% for those with a mother-in-law preferring two extra sons or more.
8 While with our data we can only show that mothers-in-law have on average stronger stated son preference than their daughters-in-law, there are evidences in the literature that they may also see female foeticide with a more favorable eye than their daughters-in-law. Indeed, Joshi and Bajwa (2012) using a sample of 200 respondents from the Jat Sikh community in Ludhiana district (Punjab) find that while 78% of the mother-in-law are neutral vis-à-vis female foeticide and 12% are favorable, among the daughter-in-law 78% are unfavorable and 23% are neutral, with none being favorable. 9 Alongside a decrease in stated son preference, an important decline in desired fertility has also occurred in India in recent years. In our sample, while mothers-in-law have on average a desire for 2.9 children, their daughters-in-law desire only 2.2 children. Higher fertility, by allowing more 'free space' for daughters, should result in smaller stated desired sex ratio, our measure of stated son preference. Indeed, if women have a desire for at least one or two sons (49% and 22% of all 124,355 women in NFHS-3 express such a desire, respectively), a lower overall fertility will automatically increases the desired sex ratio, a result first discussed by Das Gupta (1987) . Henceforth, if mother-inlaw were to have the same desired fertility than their daughter-in-law, we should expect mothers-in-law to state an even stronger stated son preference than what they do in our data.
[ Table 2 about here] However, this relationship between the mothers-in-law's son preference and their daughters-inlaw's son preference may be due to some shared characteristics believed to influence stated son preference such as the state of residence and household's wealth. We, therefore, turn next to multivariate analysis.
Multivariate Results: Mother-in-law's Influence
Base Model
From Table 3 (Column 2), it is clear that the mothers-in-law's stated son preference is significantly correlated with their daughters-in-law's stated son preference, everything else constant (and, nothing else constant, Column 1). Having a mother-in-law desiring one extra son is associated with an increase in the odds of having a son preference and even more so if the mother-in-law has a son preference of at least two extra sons. For a non-working rural North Indian Hindu woman, owning cattle and land, from a backward caste and of average wealth, who has access to media at least once a week, aged 21 years old and having six years of education and desiring 2 children, the predicted probability of desiring no extra son decreases by about 4 points of percentage by having a mother-in-law desiring two extra sons and by almost 3 points of percentage by a having a mother-in-law desiring one extra son (Table 4 , Panel A).
[ Tables 3 and 4 about here]
The results for the control variables are as expected. As the number of males in the nuclear family determines the share of land inherited once the extended family split up (Vera-Sanso 
Selection Bias
As previously mentioned, a limit to the approach adopted so far is that women who are living in extended households, with their mother-in-law, may have different characteristics than women living in nuclear households. As data on the mother-in-law's preference and characteristics are not available for women living in a nuclear household, we need to rely on a selection model to ensure that our limited sample does not bias the results.
More precisely, we use Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh's (2006) technique, an adaptation to
Heckman's original idea, to handle the sample selection issue in the context of an ordered logit model. As an exclusion restriction, we use the year since marriage, since Indian women are more likely to live in an extended household soon after marriage and, only later on, move into a nuclear household (Ram and Wong 1999 Chung and Das Gupta (2007) , Koolwal (2007) , Pande and Astone (2007) , Robitaille (2012) , Yount (2005) . For media exposure, see Pande and Astone (2007) and Robitaille (2012) .
with , an unobserved heterogeneity term and, and , two random noises. The value of is determined by the value taken by the latent variable following the rules:
The correlation between the two error terms ( ) and ( ) is
√ ( )
. A statistically significantly different than zero indicates that the model suffers from selection bias.
As shown in Table 5 (Columns 1 and 2), we conclude that there is no selection bias ( is not statistically significantly different than 0). Moreover, despite the correction, the main conclusions remain. In other words, even with a more representative sample, we would have concluded that mothers-in-law's stated son preference matters in explaining their daughters-inlaw's stated son preference.
[ Table 5 about here]
Endogeneity
Another potential limit to the approach adopted so far is that the mother-in-law's son preference might be endogenous. Indeed it is plausible that unobservable variables influence both the mother-in-law's and her daughter-in-law's son preference, such as how traditional the household is, how religious the household is, etc. The effect of those omitted variables would end up in the error term, leading to a biased coefficient for the mother-in-law's variable.
To deal with this issue, the mother-in-law's preference is instrumented. The model is then estimated using a probit model for the first stage equation (explaining motherin-law's preference) and an ordered probit for the second stage equation (explaining daughter-inlaw's preference). Given the advance of econometrics techniques in dealing with endogeneity problems in ordered models, the mother-in-law's stated son preference has to be included as a dichotomous variable, taking the value of one if she expresses a desire for at least one extra son.
The model is estimated using the user written cmp command in Stata 12 (Roodman 2009 ).
As shown in Table 6 , we again conclude that the mothers-in-law's stated son preference positively influence their daughters-in-law stated son preference.
[ Table 6 about here]
Influence Channels
In the previous section, we have seen that mother-in-law's preference has a significant impact on her daughter-in-law's preference. This result holds true for different specifications. We however still do not know which mechanisms are successfully used by mothers-in-law to influence their daughters-in-law.
As previously discussed, we believe that there are three main mechanisms used by mothers-inlaw. First, a mother-in-law can select a daughter-in-law with similar preference than herself. This "technique" is feasible in the Indian context given the high prevalence of arranged marriages and the important involvement of parents, in particular the mothers. To give an example, it is not uncommon to see a marriage advertisement, either in newspapers or on the internet, posted by the parents of the would-be husband/wife. It is also fairly common for the spouses-to-be to only briefly meet each other before the wedding, with most of the negotiation being done by the parents. If selection via the marriage market takes place, we should observe that recently married women express, already, similar son preference to their mother-in-law. This, however, would not be the case if the influence of the mother-in-law is mostly felt through socialization and coercion.
Indeed, another way for the mothers-in-law to influence their daughters-in-law is through socialization. Co-residing women are likely to spend a fair amount of time together and to influence each other's preference, through discussing and sharing ideas on the pros and cons of raising boys and girls. If this is the case, the size of the coefficient for the mother-in-law's son preference variable should increase with years of cohabitation and decreasing with the daughterin-law's age at marriage.
Finally, a mother-in-law can influence their daughter-in-law through coercion, using a "stick and carrot" strategy. By withholding resources and liberty to a daughter-in-law not given birth to son(s) or by using physical and emotional abuse, a mother-in-law can bring her daughter-in-law to share a high desire for sons, so as to improve her daily life. Support for this hypothesis would be if the mothers of sons are healthier and have more liberty than mothers of daughters. This would also be verified if, everything else constant, in areas where mothers of daughters are worse off than mother of sons, the influence of the mother-in-law is more strongly felt or if a 24 mother-in-law supporting domestic violence has a stronger influence on their daughter-in-law`s preference.
In this section, we present empirical evidence testing these three hypothesizes.
Selection of the Bride or Socialization
As previously discussed, if the mothers-in-law selects daughters-in-law with similar son preference than themselves, we should observe from the first year of marriage an "influence" of the mother-in-law on her daughter-in-law, that is, the coefficient in front of the mother-in-law's stated son preference should be positive for women who have been married for less than one year. If, however, socialization occurs, women who have been married for a longer period of time and, henceforth, who have been exposed to their mother-in-law's stated son preference over a long period of time, should be more influenced by their mother-in-law than women who just got married.
To test this hypothesis, we allow the coefficient in front of the mothers-in-law's stated son preference variable to vary according to the time since marriage. More specifically, we differentiate between women who have been married for less than one year, women who have been married for 1 to 2 years, women who have been married for 3 to 5 years and women who have been married for more than 6 years.
The results presented in Table 7 (Column 1) indicate that for the first 2 years of marriage, there is no significant impact of the mother-in-law's stated son preference on her daughter-in-law's preference (reference group: mothers-in-law with no son preference for a given number of years since marriage). However, after 3 years of marriage, we observe a positive and significant influence. Hence, while appealing, and probably happening in some cases, the idea that the 25 relation between the mother-in-law's and daughter-in-law's stated son preference comes from the marriage market does not appear in empirical data.
Future support is provided on the importance of socialization to explain mothers-in-law's influence by the model presented in Table 7 (Column 2). While the Indian law forbids marriage before the age of 18 for women, marriage before this age is very common, with 53% of our sample being married by the age of 17. The importance of mothers-in-law in socializing those very young brides should influence their stated son preference. Hence, showing that women who have been married very young are more likely to be influenced by their mothers-in-law's stated son preference would support our conclusion that socialization is a key factor determining a daughter-in-law's stated son preference.
The results from Table 7 (Column 2) speak for themselves. Women who have been married before the age of 18 are significantly influenced by their mothers-in-law stated son preference.
The more so, the younger they were at the time of marriage (we have only 47 observations for mother-in-law with a preference for 2 extra sons and a daughter-in-law who was married by the age of 15, explaining the lack of significance for this variable).
[ Table 7 about here]
Socialization or Coercion
In the previous section, we have seen that a mother-in-law's influence increases over time. While the media often gives the impression that the mother-in-law's influence is mostly done via coercion, such as emotional or physical abuse, depravation of food and freedom or overburdening their daughter-in-law with chores, it is also possible that the influence is coming from 26 a peaceful relation between the mother-in-law and her daughter-in-law, with the daughter-in-law listening to her mother-in-law's opinions.
Comparing the daily life outcomes of women who meet their mother-in-law's expectation in terms of sex ratio to the ones who have a sex ratio more biased towards girls than what is desired by the mother-in-law, we conclude that there are no statistically significant differences for our eight measures of daily life quality (Table 8) .
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[ Table 8 about here]
Similarly, when we allow the impact of the mother-in-law's stated son preference on her daughter-in-law's preference to vary according to the mother-in-law's opinion on the acceptability of physical violence for a disrespectful daughter-in-law, we do not find any statistically significant difference between those two groups ( Table 9 , Column 1).
But, while individual mothers-in-law's view on domestic violence do not have any significant impact on their influence on their daughters-in-law's stated son preference, the simple fact that in some regions a woman without a son who has at least 2 children fares worse, either in terms of physical violence, emotional violence, low BMI (less than 18.5) or say in terms of (1) daily purchase, (2) large purchase, (3) visit to friends or family, (4) how to spend husband earnings or (6) how to spend on her own health, increases the influence of the mother-in-law's preference on her daughter-in-law's preference (Table 9 , Column 2). Hence, a social environment where women can observe the importance of having son(s) to improve their daily life seems a powerful "convincing" tool to align a daughter-in-law's stated son preference to her mother-in-law's preference. Hence, rather than direct coercion by the mother-in-law, socialization on the "advantages" of having sons seem to be the key tools used by mother-in-law to align their daughters-in-law's stated son preference to theirs.
[ Table 9 about here]
Discussion and Policy Implication
In this paper, we have tested empirically a common assumption in the anthropological and sociological literature, namely, that Indian mothers-in-law have a strong influence on the decisions taken by their sons and their daughters-in-law on important personal questions, such as the number of sons they will have.
In line with our theoretical model, we find that in India, holding constant the daughter-in-law's characteristics, the mother-in-law's stated son preference still has a significant impact on their daughters-in-law's stated son preference. The result is robust to different specifications.
Due to data limitation we cannot prove which mechanisms are used by mothers-in-law to influence/coerce their daughters-in-law. However, we have provided some evidence that socialization, rather than marriage selection and coercion, seems to be the dominant mechanism behind a mother-in-law's influence. Thus our results present a much more peaceful image of daughters-in-law/mothers-in-law relations than what is usually presented in the media and in popular culture.
14 The focus of this paper is on stated son preference. However, it is likely that mothers-in-law's influence is not felt only on how many sons to bear. For example, Char et al. (2010) find that Indian mothers-in-law also have a say in the use of contraception by the young couple.
Moreover, it is highly plausible that mothers-in-law' influence could also be felt on decision regarding children's education, children's vaccination, child care such as breastfeeding, etc.
More research on those questions is necessary.
From a policy perspective, our results indicate the importance of not only targeting the reproductive age married couples to encourage them not to abort their female fetuses, to adopt contraception or to send their children to school, but also to target the mothers-in-law and, potentially, also the fathers-in-law. In this latter case, however, the limited availability of male respondents in NFHS-3 did not allow us to test the importance of fathers-in-law's stated son preference on their daughter-in-law's stated son preference. This would be an interesting avenue for future research.
The conclusion reached by this paper may also apply to countries other than India. In particular, in China, a country with an even higher sex ratio at birth, there is some evidence that grandparents' preference matters. For example, in a study by Xiaolei et al (2013) , a respondent explains the imbalance by sex ratio by saying: "It's the fault of the grandparents. The older generation still prefer sons and they put pressure on their children to have sons (Male aged 35, urban Guizhou)". Quantifying the impact of grandparents' preference on China's sex ratio is another interesting avenue for future research. 
Tables
